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JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY with certain actions. Examples of organizational innovations of this nature are the court system, the credit bureau, and the firm. The introduction of a new organization reflects an increase in the stock of knowledge, which may be the outcome of an intentional pursuit or unintentional experimentation.
A necessary condition for an organizational change, however, is that those able to initiate it expect to gain from it. Their expectations depend on their cultural beliefs, and hence diverse cultural beliefs lead to a distinct trajectory of organizational development. The distinctiveness of each trajectory is reinforced by the process of modifying and refining "microinventions," which follows an "organizational macroinvention."4 Diverse paths of organizational development, in turn, further affect the historical process of equilibrium selection. Once a specific organization is introduced, it influences the rules of historically subsequent games and hence the resulting societal organization.
Cultural beliefs also influence societal organization since strategic interactions occur within a specific social and historical context. Diverse cultural beliefs can lead to differential economic behavior toward individuals with diverse social characteristics such as wealth or "membership" in a specific social group. For example, different cultural beliefs may imply diverse social constructs-diverse social patterns of economic interactions-each of which entails different dynamics of wealth distribution. Different cultural beliefs may also imply different relations between efficiency and profitability in intrasociety and intersociety economic interactions. Some cultural beliefs can render efficient intersociety relations unprofitable, leading to an economically inefficient social structure.
Various social patterns of economic interactions further affect societal organization by, for example, the process examined by the eminent sociologist George Homans (1950) . Frequent economic interactions among the same individuals give rise to "friendliness," and satisfaction from friendliness motivates them to interact further, socially as well as economically. These repeated interactions and the resulting social networks for information transmission facilitate informal collective economic and social punishments for deviant behavior (see also Dawes and Thaler 1988) .
Finally, social and economic patterns of interactions also affect moral enforcement mechanisms, that is, enforcement based on the tendency of humans to derive utility from acting according to their values. Although this tendency seems to be universal, different patterns of social and economic interactions lead to the development of 
III. Agency Relations and Cultural Beliefs
The Italian city-states of the late medieval period were the forerunners of the emerging post-Roman, European economy. Among these cities, Genoa stands out for its commercial importance and excellent historical records from as early as the late eleventh century, when the city was incorporated. These records enable examining the emergence of its societal organization. The examination is facilitated by the fact, reflected in the saying genuensis ergo Mercator (Genoese, therefore merchant), that long-distance overseas trade was central to Genoa's economy. Similarly, trade was central to a group of eleventh-century traders from the Muslim world known as the Maghribi traders. These Jewish merchants were involved in large-scale, long-distance trade all over the Muslim Mediterranean.6
The Maghribis and the Genoese faced a similar environment, employed comparable naval technology, and traded in similar goods. The efficiency of their trade depended, to a large extent, on their ability to mitigate an organizational problem related to a specific transaction, namely, the provision of the services required for handling a merchant's goods abroad.7 A merchant could either provide these services himself by traveling between trade centers or hire overseas agents in trade centers abroad to handle his merchandise. Employing agents was efficient, since it saved the time and risk of traveling, allowed diversifying sales across trade centers, and so forth.8 Yet without supporting institutions, agency relations could not be established since an agent could embezzle the merchant's goods. Anticipating this behavior, a merchant would not hire an agent to begin with.
For agents to be employed, the organization of society had to enable them to commit themselves ex ante to be honest ex post, after 5 This view of culture as a "legitimizing" mechanism is fundamental in Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim. For recent economic analyses, see Sugden (1989) and Rabin (in press). 6 For a general introduction to Genoa's history, see Vitale (1955) . For a general introduction to the Maghribis' history, see Goitein (1967) , Gil (1983b, vol . 1), and Greif (1989 Greif ( , 1993a .
7 Williamson (1985) calls attention to the importance of using transaction as a unit of analysis.
For the superiority of trading systems that employ agents, see, e.g., De Roover (1965) . receiving the merchant's goods. The societal organization of the Maghribis and the Genoese enabled them to mitigate this commitment problem, and in both groups trade was based on agency relations among nonfamily members. For example, the first Genoese historical source reflecting agency relations, the cartulary of Giovanni Scriba (1 155-64), indicates that in its approximately 612 contracts reflecting trade, only 5.3 percent did not entail agency relations, and only 6.45 percent of the sum sent abroad through agents was entrusted to family members.
To examine how each group mitigated the merchant-agent commitment problem, consider the following perfect and complete information One-Side Prisoner's Dilemma (OSPD) game, which captures the essence of the problem. (Extensions are discussed below.) There are M merchants and A agents in the economy, and (in accordance with the historical evidence) it is assumed that M < A. Players live an infinite number of periods, agents have a time discount factor J3, and an unemployed agent receives a reservation utility per period of Xu 2 0. In each period, an agent can be hired by only one merchant, and a merchant can employ only one agent. Matching is random, but a merchant can restrict the matching to a subset of the unemployed agents that contains the agents who, according to the information available to the merchant, have previously taken particular sequences of actions. A merchant who does not hire an agent receives a payoff of K > 0. A merchant who hires an agent decides what wage (W 2 0) to offer the agent. An employed agent can decide whether to be honest or to cheat. If he is honest, the merchant's payoff is -y -W. and the agent's payoff is W. Hence the gross gain from cooperation is my, and it is assumed that cooperation is efficient, -y> K + 4Pa The merchant's wage offer is assumed credible, since in reality the agent held the goods and could determine the ex post allocation of gains. For that reason, if the agent cheats, the merchant's payoff is zero and the agent's payoff is a > 'u. Finally, a merchant prefers receiving K over being cheated or paying W = ax, that is, K > y -O.
After the allocation of the payoffs, each merchant can decide whether to terminate his relations with his agent or not. There is a probability u, however, that a merchant is forced to terminate agency relations, and this assumption captures merchants' limited ability to commit to future employment because of the need to shift commercial operations over places and goods and the high uncertainty of commerce and life during that period. For similar reasons, the merchants are assumed to be unable to condition wage on past conduct (indeed, merchants in neither group did so). Finally, in neither group was wage a function of political or legal considerations. Wages were not determined by the court or politically supported guild. Accord-CULTURAL BELIEFS 919 ingly, and as is customary in similar efficiency wage models (e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984) , the analysis assumes that no subgroup is organized in a manner that affects wage determination. Furthermore, attention is restricted to equilibria in which wages are constant over time. ' Suppose for the moment that the history of the game is common knowledge. What is the minimum (symmetric) wage for which, if it is offered by all merchants, an agent's best response is to be honest under the threat of firing if he cheats and the promise of being rehired if he is honest (unless forced separation occurs)? To find this wage, one has to fully specify the merchants' strategies. Yet to analyze the impact of different strategies in the same framework, the analysis initially concentrates on probabilities that are a function of the strategies. Denote as an honest agent an unemployed agent who was honest in the last period he was employed, and by hh the probability that he will be hired in that period. Denote as a cheater an agent who cheated in the last period he was employed, and by h, the probability that he will be hired. Proposition 1, which is proved in the Appendix, specifies the minimum wage that supports cooperation. PROPOSITION 1. Assume that I E (0, 1), and hc < 1. The optimal wage, the lowest wage for which an agent's best response is to play honest, is We = w(1, hh, hc, u, u, at) > Xu, and w is monotonically decreasing in i and hh and monotonically increasing in hc, u, Cur and xt.
A merchant induces honesty by the carrot of a wage higher than the agent's reservation utility and the stick of terminating their relations. For a wage high enough, the difference between the present value of the lifetime expected utility of an unemployed and employed agent is higher than what an agent can gain by one-period play of cheating, and hence the agent's best response is to be honest. The minimum wage that ensures honesty decreases in the factors that increase the lifetime expected utility of an honest agent relative to that of a cheater (i.e., L and hh) and increases in the factors that increase the relative lifetime expected utility of a cheater (i.e., hc, a, tk' and at). How can differences between collectivist and individualist societies manifest themselves in agency relations? Intuitively, in collectivist societies everyone is expected to respond to whatever has transpired between any specific merchant and agent, whereas the opposite holds for individualist societies. Two strategy combinations formalize this difference: the individualist and the collectivist strategies. In each strat-920 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY egy a merchant hires, for a wage W*, an unemployed agent whom he rehires as long as cheating or forced separation does not occur. Under the individualist strategy, however, a merchant randomly hires an unemployed agent, whereas under the collectivist strategy a merchant randomly hires only from among the unemployed agents who have never cheated. An agent's strategy is to play honest if and only if he is offered at least the We relevant to him given the history of the game. Note that We is lower under the collectivist strategy. Each of these strategies is a subgame perfect equilibrium as established in proposition 2 (proved in the Appendix). PROPOSITION 2. Assume that under both the individualist and the collectivist strategy combinations y -K 2 W*; then each strategy combination is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the OSPD game.
The individualist strategy is a subgame perfect equilibrium because merchants are not expected to take into account the agent's past behavior when making hiring decisions. Hence each merchant perceives the probability that an unemployed agent who cheated in the past will be hired to equal that of an unemployed honest agent. According to proposition 1, this implies that each merchant is indifferent whether to hire a cheater or an honest agent. (As discussed below, when the decision to acquire information is endogenous, under individual equilibrium the merchant would not have the related information.)
Under the collectivist equilibrium, because each merchant expects others not to employ a cheater, the perceived probability that a cheater will be hired is lower than that of an honest agent. According to proposition 1, this implies that a higher wage is required to keep him honest, and hence the merchant strictly prefers to hire an honest agent. The merchant's expectations are self-enforcing, although cheating does not convey any information about future behavior; the agent's strategy does not call for cheating any merchant who violates the collective punishment; and merchants do not "punish" any merchant who hires a cheater.
The analysis above assumed that the history of the game is common knowledge. Acquiring and transmitting information during the late medieval period were costly, and hence the model should incorporate a merchant's decisions to acquire costly information. Since merchants gathered information by being a part of an informal informationsharing network, suppose that each merchant can either "invest" or "not invest" in "getting attached" to a network before the game begins, and his action is common knowledge. Investing requires paying A each period, in return for which the merchant learns the private histories of all the merchants who also invested. Otherwise, he knows only his own history. Intuitively, under the individualist equilibrium, history has no value, since an agent's wage does not depend on it. Hence no merchant will invest in information. In contrast, under the collectivist equilibrium, history has value since the optimal wage is a function of an agent's history. Merchants will invest since an agent who cheated in the past will cheat if hired and paid the equilibrium wage. Although on the equilibrium path cheating never occurs, merchants are motivated to invest, since this action is common knowledge and hence one who does not invest is cheated if he pays the equilibrium W*. This intuition is verified in proposition 3, which is proved by inspection. PROPOSITION 3. W*, is the minimum wage that merchant i has to pay his agent if only he does not invest; W* is the equilibrium wage under the collectivist strategy in the full information game. Invest and the collectivist strategy is an equilibrium iff W* -WE 2 A. Not to invest and the individualist strategy is an equilibrium whereas invest and the individualist strategy is not an equilibrium.
Reality may also be characterized by incomplete information; that is, some agents may have an unobservable "bad" attribute and thus be more likely to cheat. The analysis above holds when the proportion of the bad type is "high" or "low." Under a collectivist equilibrium, incomplete information reinforces investment in information. Under an individualist equilibrium, the value of information may still be zero (if the proportion of the bad type is high) or may not be high enough to induce investment in information (if the proportion of the bad type is low). Hence this paper uses the complete information model, which highlights the role of expectations with respect to actions and abstracts away from expectations with respect to types (see the discussion in Greif [1989 Greif [ , 1993a ). This section relates two societal organizations and different cultural beliefs, that is, different expectations with respect to actions that will be taken off the path of play. In an individualist equilibrium, players are expected to be indifferent, and in a collectivist equilibrium players are expected to respond to whatever transpires between others. Since these cultural beliefs correspond to an equilibrium, they are selfenforcing, and each entails a different wage, enforcement institution (second-vs. third-party enforcement), and investment in information.
On the equilibrium path, the individualist and collectivist cultural beliefs entail the same actions with respect to agents: merchants randomly hire unemployed agents and agents never cheat. By assuming complete information, the discussion above and the next section's analysis enable concentration on cultural beliefs concerning actions that never actually transpire, thereby emphasizing the implications for societal organization of diverse expectations regarding actions rather than the actions themselves. Hence the following analysis iden-922 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY tifies cultural beliefs with probability distributions over the off-thepath-of-play portion of a strategy combination generating an observed path of play.'0 Historically, imperfect monitoring is a likely cause of the observed punishment phases, and thus, historically, it is not feasible to distinguish between cultural beliefs relating to on and off the path of play, and no attempt to do so is made."
IV. The Maghribis and Genoese: Origin and Manifestations of Diverse Cultural Beliefs
Are there historical reasons to believe that the Maghribis and the Genoese held diverse cultural beliefs? The historical records do not provide any reason to believe that a particular theory of equilibrium selection is relevant in this case. They indicate, however, that cultural "focal points" as well as social and political events in the early development of these societies were likely to be instrumental in shaping diverse cultural beliefs and the related equilibria in these groups. When the Maghribis began trading in the Mediterranean early in the eleventh century and when the Genoese began trading toward the end of that century, they had already internalized different cultures and were in the midst of different social and political processes. Their cultural heritage and the nature of these processes suggest that among the Maghribis a collectivist equilibrium was a natural focal point, whereas among the Genoese an individualist equilibrium was the natural focal point. The Maghribis were musta'ribun, that is, non-Muslims who adopted the values of the Muslim society. Among these values is the view that they were members of the same umma. This term, although translated as "nation," is derived from the word umm, meaning "mother," reflecting the basic value of mutual responsibility among 10 In Greif (in press) this subset is referred to as "behavioral beliefs." In a perfect information extensive form game, denote by P a path of play, and define S(P) to be the set of all strategy combinations for which the path of play is P. Denote the cultural beliefs of player i by CBi(S(P)) defined as a probability distribution over S(P). Note that diverse cultural beliefs differ only in terms of expectations concerning behavior off the path of play. When it is common knowledge that CBi(P(S)) = {prob(s*(P) = 1)} V i for some s*(P) and Ui(s*, CB.(S(P))) 2 U(si, CBi(P(S))) Viandsi E Si, then s* is a Nash equilibrium. Hence s*(P) is an equilibrium and the associated cultural beliefs are self-enforcing.
" For a discussion of imperfect monitoring models, see Pearce (1992) . Under imperfect monitoring, agents will be punished on the equilibrium path. This does not qualitatively alter the results of this paper.
the members of that society (see, e.g., Cahen 1970). Further, members of the umma share the fundamental duty not only to practice good but also to ensure that others do not practice sin (B. Lewis 1988). In addition, the Maghribis were part of the Jewish community, within which it is a prominent idea that "All Israel is responsible for every member." Furthermore, as is common among immigrant groups, the Maghribis, who migrated from Iraq to Tunisia, retained social ties that enabled them to transmit the information required to support a collectivist equilibrium. The associated collectivist cultural beliefs in turn encouraged retaining an affiliation with this information network. In contrast, Christianity during that period placed the individual rather than his social group at the center of its theology. It advanced the creation of "a new society based not on the family but on the individual, whose salvation, like his original loss of innocence, was personal and private" (Hughes 1974, p. 61). Indeed, the contract through which the Genoese established their city shortly before 1099 was a contract between individuals, not between families or other social groups. Furthermore, for political reasons the number of Genoese active in trade rose dramatically toward the end of the twelfth century. Instead of a few dozen traders who had previously been active in each trade center abroad, hundreds of Genoese began trading. At the same time, Genoa experienced a high level of immigration. For instance, Genoa's population increased from 30,000 to 100,000 between 1200 and 1300. In the absence of appropriate social networks for information transmission, the individualist equilibrium was likely to be selected. Once it was selected, individualist cultural beliefs discouraged investment in information. In the absence of a coordinating mechanism, a switch to a collectivist equilibrium was not likely to occur.
Collectivist cultural beliefs were a focal point among the Maghribis, and individualist cultural beliefs were a focal point among the Genoese. Does the historical evidence indicate the existence of the related societal organizations? That is, was there high investment in information and collective punishment among the Maghribis and low investment in information and individualist punishment among the Genoese?
The historical evidence indicates that the Maghribis invested in sharing information and the Genoese did not. Each Maghribi corresponded with many other Maghribi traders by sending informative letters to them with the latest available commercial information and "gossip," including whatever transpired in agency relations among other Maghribis. Important business dealings were conducted in public, and the names of the witnesses were widely publicized (Goitein 14 For other examples and a discussion, see Greif (1989 Greif ( , 1993a In this extended game, two social patterns of agency relations and associated dynamic patterns of wealth distribution can emerge. The first is a vertical social structure in which merchants find it optimal and therefore employ only agents, and hence an individual functions as either a merchant or an agent. The second is a horizontal social structure in which merchants employ only other merchants, and thus an individual functions as an agent and a merchant, providing and receiving agency services. What are the relations between cultural beliefs and these social patterns of agency relations?
Intuitively, under collectivist cultural beliefs, a merchant's capital functions as a bond that reduces the optimal wage required to keep him honest. If a merchant cheats while functioning as an agent, he is no longer able to hire agents under the threat of collective punishment. Hence, cheating by a merchant while he functions as an agent reduces the future rate of return on his capital. This implies that a merchant who had cheated while functioning as an agent had to bear a cost that an agent (who cannot function as a merchant) would not have to bear. Hence a lower wage is required to keep a merchant honest, and each merchant is motivated to hire another merchant as his agent, leading to a horizontal social structure. This is not the case, however, under individualist cultural beliefs. Past cheating does not reduce the rate of return on a merchant's capital. But having capital to invest de facto increases a merchant's reservation utility relative to that of an agent, thereby increasing the wage required to keep him honest. Merchants are discouraged from hiring other merchants as their agents, leading to a vertical social structure.'7 More formally, consider the optimal wage required to ensure the honesty of a merchant who functions as an agent (under the assumption that each merchant is risk neutral and has the discount factor A). The present value of the lifetime expected utility of the merchant if he is always honest is the sum of the present value of his expected utility from being an agent, Vh, and the present value of his expected utility from being a merchant, (-y -W*)/(1 -A), that is, Vh + [(y -W*)/(l -A)]. If this merchant cheats while providing agency services, the present value of his expected utility from being an agent is the sum of his current gain from cheating, ax, plus the lifetime expected utility of a cheater, Va. In addition, he receives from being a merchant in the current period -y -We plus the present value of the future periods' expected utility from being a merchant who had cheated, V,. Hence the present value of his lifetime expected utility is cx + -y -We + Vm + Va. For a merchant to be honest when providing agency services, he should not be able to gain from one period of cheating; that is, Diverse cultural beliefs not only affect social patterns of economic interactions but also lead to diverse dynamics of wealth distribution. Ceteris paribus, a vertical society provides better opportunity for "upward" mobility to wealthless individuals (in a partial equilibrium framework). Since under individualist cultural beliefs an agent's ability to commit is negatively related to his wealth, wealthless individuals are better able to capture the rent (above the reservation utility) available to agents. In a horizontal society, wealthless individuals are not able to capture the rent available to agents, since under collectivist cultural beliefs one's commitment ability is positively related to one's wealth. The Genoese also responded to the new opportunities by emigrating abroad, and their cartularies indicate that agency relations between Genoese prevailed. Yet although the cartularies were written in Genoa and hence are biased toward reflecting agency relations among Genoese, they nevertheless clearly indicate the establishment of agency relations between Genoese and non-Genoese. For example, in the cartulary of the Genoese Giovanni Scriba (1155-64), at least 18.3 percent of the total sent abroad through agents was sent or carried by a non-Genoese.25
The historical sources are mute with respect to the dynamics of wealth distribution among the Maghribis, but the Genoese sources reflect a dynamics of wealth distribution that conforms to the theoretical prediction. Wealth transfer is reflected in a declining concentration of trade investment and the increase, over time, of trade investment made by commoners (i.e., nonnobles). In the cartulary of
The rationale behind the different responses of the Maghribis and the Genoese to the same exogenous change in the rules of the game is clear once one considers the impact of cultural beliefs on equilibrium selection. The change altered the OSPD game in a specific manner. As trade with more remote trade centers became possible, a merchant could either hire an agent from his own economy who would sail or emigrate abroad, or hire an agent native to the other trade center. Such intereconomy agency relations are likely to be more efficient than intraeconomy agency relations since they enhance commercial flexibility, and a native agent does not need to immigrate and is likely to possess a better knowledge of local conditions.
In deciding whether to establish intereconomy agency relations, however, a merchant is concerned with profitability and not efficiency. The relations between efficiency and profitability are influenced by cultural beliefs that had crystallized before intereconomy agency relations became possible. Individualist cultural beliefs lead to an "integrated" society in which intereconomy agency relations are established if they are efficient. Collectivist cultural beliefs create a wedge between efficient and profitable agency relations, leading to a "segregated" society in which efficient intereconomy agency relations are not established. Whenever there is uncertainty whether collectivist cultural beliefs or individualist cultural beliefs will be practiced in intereconomy agency relations, these more efficient agency relations are less profitable to collectivist merchants since they increase the agents' wages.
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Intuitively, when players project their cultural beliefs on the new game-that is, when their expectations concerning others' actions in the postchange game are the prechange expectations-these prechange cultural beliefs constitute the initial conditions for a dynamic adjustment process.26 For example, if the prechange economies were collectivist, players expect each merchant to hire agents from his own economy and expect that merchants of the same economy will retaliate against an agent who has cheated one of them. Yet the prechange cultural beliefs are insufficient to calculate best responses in the postchange game. They do not stipulate a complete strategy for a player, since the same prechange behavior implies off-the-path-of-play situations in the postchange game that did not exist before. For example, the prechange cultural beliefs do not specify how merchants from one economy would react to actions taken by an agent from their economy in intereconomy agency relations. As the others' strategies are not specified, a player cannot find his best response.
To find his best response, a merchant has to form expectations about the response of the merchants from the other economy to actions taken in intereconomy agency relations. Although the merchants from the agent's economy can be expected to respond in various ways, two responses predominate. For any agent's action in intereconomy agency relations, the merchants from the agent's economy can regard him either as one who cheated one of them or as one who did not cheat one of them. For example, in a collectivist economy the merchants can consider an agent who cheated in intereconomy agency relations as a cheater subject to collective retaliation, or they can ignore his cheating. There is nothing in the prechange cultural beliefs, however, that indicates which of these responses will be selected for each action. Accordingly, the best that can be done analytically is to assume that in intereconomy agency relations any probability distribution over these two responses is possible.27 Considering the prechange cultural beliefs and any such probability distributions as initial conditions enables examination of the merchants' best response (while not imposing any differences between the prechange economies apart from their cultural beliefs).
What would the merchants' best response be as a function of their cultural beliefs? It is easier to present the related analysis, assuming 933 initially that there is no efficiency gain from intereconomy agency relations. Intuitively, when intereconomy agency relations become possible between two collectivist economies, the initial cultural beliefs specify collective punishment in intraeconomy agency relations. But if there is some doubt whether collective punishment also governs intereconomy agency relations, the optimal wage in intereconomy agency relations is higher than in intraeconomy relations. It is higher because the uncertainty about collective punishment in intereconomy relations reduces the probability that an agent who cheats in such relations will be punished, and, as established in proposition 1, this increases the optimal wage. As the merchants' cost of establishing intereconomy agency relations is higher than the cost of establishing intraeconomy agency relations, only the latter will be initiated, and segregation is the end result. If intereconomy agency relations are more efficient, the analysis implies that merchants will initiate them only if the efficiency gains are sufficiently large.
The foregoing analysis does not hold when intereconomy agency relations become possible between two individualistic economies. Although similar uncertainty is likely to exist, the intereconomy and intraeconomy optimal wages are the same. Individualist cultural beliefs make this uncertainty irrelevant for the determination of the optimal wage. Hence any efficiency gains from intereconomy agency relations will motivate merchants to establish them. Proposition 4 (which is proved in the Appendix) makes the intuitive discussion above precise. For this proposition, however, some definitions are required.
A joint economy is segregated if, given the initial conditions, merchants from each economy strictly prefer to hire agents from their own economy. A joint economy is integrated if, given the initial conditions, merchants from at least one economy are indifferent about the original economy of their agents. Denote a merchant from economy s by Ms and an agent from economy t by At, where s, t E {K, J}.
Denote by [L the perceived probability that merchants from economy s will consider an As last employed by Mt as a cheater if he cheated when employed by Mt. Denote by Xq the perceived probability that merchants from economy s will consider an As, last employed by Mt, as a cheater if he was honest when employed by Mt. 
When intereconomy agency relations become possible between a collectivist and an individualist economy, a collectivist merchant would not initiate intereconomy agency relations regardless of the uncertainty regarding the individualist merchants' responses.28 The wage he has to pay to keep the agent honest is higher than the wage in the collectivist economy, since the collectivist economy's wage is lower than the individualist economy's wage. Hence collectivist cultural beliefs create a wedge between efficient and profitable agency relations and will be initiated by collectivist merchants only if efficiency gains from interagency relations are high enough.
In contrast, because the collectivist economy's wage is lower, individualist merchants may find it optimal to establish intereconomy relations even if such relations do not imply efficiency gains, thereby inducing (asymmetric) integration. To see why, consider the uncertainty regarding the collectivist merchants' responses that decreases the profitability of intereconomy relations the most. Hence suppose that the collectivist merchant would not impose a collective punishment on a cheater ([l = 0) but would impose punishment on an agent who was honest in intereconomy relations (aq = 1). The expectations that collectivist merchants would not collectively punish a cheater in intereconomy relations cannot by themselves (i.e., when -= [ = 0) decrease the profitability of intereconomy relations enough to prevent integration. They imply that if a collectivist agent who was employed by an individualist merchant becomes unemployed, his lifetime expected utility equals that of any unemployed collectivist agent. Hence the individualist economy wage is more than required to keep the agent honest, since the lifetime expected utility of an unemployed collectivist agent is lower than that of an individualist agent. Hence it is profitable for an individualist merchant to hire a collectivist agent.
If collectivist merchants are also expected to consider an agent who was honest in intereconomy agency relations to be a cheater (aq > 0), the wage that has to be paid to a collectivist agent by an individualist merchant increases further. An unemployed collectivist agent who was honest in intereconomy agency relations has a lower lifetime expected utility than other unemployed collectivist agents. Hence a higher wage (than when -q = 0) is required to induce honesty. Nevertheless, integration may still follow, since an honest agent will become unemployed only in the future. Thus only if the agent's time discount factor, 3, is high enough or the probability of forced separation, a, low enough would these expected responses by the collectivist merchants forestall intereconomy agency relations.
Individualist (but not collectivist) merchants are likely to induce integration, and they may find it profitable to initiate intereconomy agency relations even if they do not imply efficiency gains and no matter what the uncertainty is regarding the collectivist merchants' responses. Segregation can result, however, if the expected response of the collectivist merchants erects "barriers to exit" for collectivist agents.29 Furthermore, since integration increases the wage in the collectivist economy, collectivist merchants may strive to prevent intereconomy agency relations through social or political actions. Proposition 5 establishes the necessary and sufficient conditions for integration and segregation (it is proved, under the same assumptions as in proposition 4, in the Appendix). During the twelfth century the Genoese ceased to use the ancient custom of entering contracts by a handshake and developed an extensive legal system for registration and enforcement of contracts. Furthermore, the customary contract law that governed the relations between Genoese traders was codified as permanent courts were established (Vitale 1955) . In contrast, despite the existence of a welldeveloped Jewish communal court system, the Maghribis entered contracts informally, adopted an informal code of conduct, and attempted to resolve disputes informally (Goitein 1967; Greif 1989 Greif , 1993a .
The relations between cultural beliefs and organizational development are reflected not only in these general processes but also in organizations that served specific economic aims. For example, in medieval trade, the need for enforcement organizations to support collective action was likely to manifest itself in relations between traders and rulers. The medieval ruler could abuse the property rights of alien traders visiting his territory. As long as the number of traders was low, the relatively high value for the ruler of each trader's future trade was sufficient to motivate the ruler to respect their rights. When the number of traders was large, however, this was no longer the case. A mechanism that might provide protection to traders at the higher volume of trade is for (sufficiently many) traders to respond-in the form of a trade embargo-to transgressions by the ruler against any trader. Once an embargo is declared, however, some traders can benefit from ignoring it and selling their goods in the prohibited area in times of shortage. Hence, some enforcement mechanism is required to assure that each trader will indeed respect a collective decision to impose an embargo.30 In collectivist societies, one would expect that informal enforcement mechanisms would be sufficient to ensure traders' compliance with embargo decisions. In individualist societies, however, one would expect organizations specializing in embargo enforcement to emerge. Indeed, the historical evidence concerning the Maghribis and the In sharp contrast, the city of Genoa functioned as a formal enforcement organization to make the threat of collective retaliation credible. After the authorities had declared that a certain area was a devetum, any merchant found there was subject to legal prosecution. For example, in 1340 the ruler of Tabriz (an important trade center between the Black Sea and the Persian Gulf) abused many Genoese traders, and Genoa responded by declaring a devetum against the city. In 1343, during the devetum, a Genoese merchant named Tommaso Gentile was on his way from Hormuz to China. Somewhere in the Pamir plateau he fell sick and had to entrust his goods to his companions and head back to Genoa by the shortest route. His way, however, passed through Tabriz. When this became known in Genoa, Tommaso's father had to justify the transgression before the court, which accepted the claim of an act of God and acquitted Tommaso without penalty (Lopez 1943 , pp. 181-83) .
The history of the modern bill of lading provides another example of a development of formal organizations among the Genoese but not among the Maghribis. This bill combines an earlier version of the bill of lading with a so-called bill of advice. The former was the ship's scribe's receipt for the goods the merchant deposited on the ship. This receipt was sent by the merchant to his overseas agent, who then claimed the goods on the basis of the scribe's own signature. The letter of advice was sent after the ship arrived at its destination by the ship's scribe to the consignee, who did not come to claim the goods. The bill of lading and the letter of advice surmounted an organizational problem related to the shipping of goods abroad.
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The earliest known European bill of lading and letter of advice date from the 1390s and relate to the trade of Genoa, whereas the Maghribi traders hardly ever used the bill of lading even though it was known to them. 
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JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY related to agency relations. For example, recall that proposition 1 established that a reduction in the probability of forced separation, a, reduces the optimal wage. That is, the more likely it is that there will be future relations between a specific agent and merchant, the less that merchant has to pay his agent. Yet the magnitude of this reduction is a function of cultural beliefs. This is so because the gains from reducing the probability of forced separation depend on the probability that a cheater will be rehired and the probability that an honest agent will be rehired. The lower the probability that a cheater will be rehired and the higher the probability that an honest agent will be rehired, the lower the gain from changing the probability of forced separation. Furthermore, when an unemployed honest agent will be rehired with probability one, the gain from changing the probability of forced separation is zero. That is, a2 W(-)/ah~da > 0 (for C > hc), a2W(*)/ahhaa < 0, and finally, aWhau = 0 when hh = 1.
Collectivist cultural beliefs and the resulting segregation and collective punishment increase, and may bring to one, the probability that an honest agent will be rehired. Furthermore, these factors are likely to bring to zero the probability that a cheater would be rehired. Thus, under collectivist beliefs and segregation, a merchant's incentive to reduce the probability of forced separation is marginal, or even absent. In contrast, under individualist cultural beliefs and the resulting integration and second-party punishment, merchants are motivated to establish an organization that reduces the likelihood of forced separation.
The evolution of family relations and business organization among the Maghribis and the Genoese suggests that the latter but not the former introduced an organization that changed the probability of forced separation. When the Maghribi and the Genoese merchants first began trading in the Mediterranean, it was common in both groups for a trader's son to start operating independently during his father's lifetime. The father would typically help the son until he was able to operate on his own. After the father's death, his estate was divided among his heirs and his business dissolved.33 Later development of family relations and business organization, however, differs substantially. During the thirteenth century the Genoese traders adopted the family firm, the essence of which was a permanent partnership with unlimited and joint liability. This organization preserved the family wealth undivided under one ownership, and a trader's son,
VIII. Conclusions
Constrained by the same technology and environment and facing the same organizational problem, the Maghribis and the Genoese had divergent cultural heritages and political and social histories that gave rise to different cultural beliefs. Theoretically, their cultural beliefs are sufficient to account for their diverse trajectories of societal organization, indicating how these forces may have had a lasting impact despite their temporary nature. Collectivist cultural beliefs constituted part of the Maghribis' collective enforcement mechanism and induced investment in information, segregation, horizontal economic interactions, and a stable pattern of wealth distribution. The endogenous partition of society restricted economic and social interactions to a small group and further facilitated in-group communication and economic and social collective punishments. Collectivist cultural beliefs led to a societal organization based on the group's ability to use economic, social, and, most likely, moral sanctions against deviants.
In contrast, individualist cultural beliefs constituted a part of the second-party enforcement mechanism of the Genoese and induced a low level of communication, a vertical social structure, economic and social integration, and wealth transfer to the relatively poor. These manifestations of individualist cultural beliefs weakened the dependence of each individual on any specific group, thereby limiting each group's ability to use economic, social, and moral sanctions against individual members. Individualist cultural beliefs led to a societal organization based on legal, political, and (second-party) economic organizations for enforcement and coordination.
The analysis demonstrates how the interactions between institutions, exogenous changes, and the process of organizational innovation govern the historical development of societal organization and the related economic, political, legal, and social constructs. Each of these elements complements the others to generate a self-sustained system, and each of the two systems analyzed in this paper has different efficiency implications. The collectivist system is more efficient in supporting intraeconomy agency relations and requires less costly formal organizations (such as law courts), but it restricts efficient intereconomy agency relations. The individualist system does not restrict intereconomy agency relations but is less efficient in supporting intraeconomy relations and requires costly formal organizations. 
Inequality (A2) states that if At may not be punished by the merchants from economy t for cheating Ms, then the perceived probability that he be hired after cheating Ms is higher than that of an agent from economy s. Simply stated, At, after cheating Ms, has an employment option not available to As, namely, to be hired by the merchants from his own economy. Proposition 2 established that the function w increases in hc and decreases in hh. Thus for s = K and t = J. 
